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I.  Introduction
Two decades ago, most workers with pensions had a defined benefit (DB) plan.  The
employer made necessary contributions and investments to meet promised pension benefit
payments when the employee retired.  By 1993, the tide had turned; more than half of covered
employees participated primarily in defined contribution (DC) plans such as 401(k) plans (EBRI,
1997).  Under DC plans, the employee and employer make regular payments into investment
accounts that accumulate tax-free until retirement.  The employee typically bears the primary
responsibility for investing the contributions and for making supplemental contributions to
ensure a satisfactory retirement income.  This dramatic shift is most noticeable among small
employers, but it is also present in large employers, state and local governments (Dow Jones,
1995), and other countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom (Flavelle, 1997; Martinson,
1998).
This fundamental shift in the nature of pension saving has not gone unnoticed by
observers in the popular press and in academia.  Aside from anecdotal information, however,
there is surprisingly little information about the relative adequacy of defined contribution plans.
Consider three fundamental yet largely unanswered questions about this shift.  First, are DC
plans, compared to DB plans, adequate in providing for a comfortable retirement pension?
Some financial writers have suggested that the DC pension system is a crisis waiting to happen
when current generations, having made minimal (or no) contributions to their DC plan, retire
with inadequate pension asset balances (Ferguson and Blackwell, 1995; Willette, 1995).
Second, will employees end up with inadequate retirement benefits because when
switching jobs, they use their DC asset balances to buy houses, boats, or other purchases rather
than reinvesting them in another retirement account (Schultz, 1993)?  Alternatively, will they2
erode the value of their accounts by borrowing against the accounts before retirement (Crenshaw,
1997)?   Even if contribution rates and investment returns are adequate, retirees could face
financial distress if they spend much of the balances while young, either during job transitions or
by borrowing.
 Third, will DC plans expose workers to more risk?  The risk can come from two sources.
One source is the uncertainty about rates of return on investments in the DC accounts.
Employees may be uninformed about their investment choices, lack the confidence to manage
their own retirement money, or suffer from poor stock market and bond returns (Ferguson and
Blackwell, 1995; Flaherty, 1997).  The other source of uncertainty is related to variability in
future earnings.  Defined contribution plans have payouts based on a worker’s average earnings
over a whole career but lack explicit mechanisms to pool earnings risk across workers.  Benefits
from DB plans are typically based on earnings during the last few years of service, which are
more risky than a career average, but often include provisions such as minimum benefits and
maximum benefit caps that reduce risk in a cross-section of workers (Bodie, Marcus, and
Merton, 1988).
These questions have proved difficult to evaluate in the past because of the substantial
heterogeneity in DB and DC plans across individual firms and in the contribution and investment
decisions of workers in DC plans.  In order to understand what was lost when traditional DB
plans fell from prominence, we need to be able to calculate pension benefits under a broad range
of labor and capital market scenarios for a representative sample of households with pensions.
We make our comparison using the supplemental Pension Provider Survey (PPS) to the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1983 and the self-reported characteristics of pension plans in
the subsequent SCFs through 1995.3
Using the methodology in Samwick (1993a), we estimate the “average” pension benefit
by running a broad range of simulated earnings histories through the weighted sample of DB
plans from 1983 (prior to the proliferation of DC plans) and DC plans from 1995.  The detailed
pension formulas from the PPS combined with simulated earnings histories and historical asset
returns allow us to determine whether defined contribution plans are more or less generous, and
more or less risky, than defined benefit plans, given plausible assumptions about investment and
earnings risk faced by workers over their remaining working lives.
The results suggest that defined contribution plans are not the ticking time bomb that
many fear.  Using actual contribution and investment allocations from a nationally representative
sample, mean and median DC pension benefits are substantially higher than the corresponding
DB benefits. If some DC plans in 1995 did not provide adequately for retirement, then neither
did many DB plan in 1983.  This result is robust to changes in simulated equity rates of return,
productivity growth, and earnings uncertainty.
Even when employees change jobs before retirement, pension benefits still tend to be
lower under the older DB plans because of the backloading of pension accruals.  Our simulations
show that employees with DC plans need only roll over approximately 25 percent of
distributions received early in their careers and 50 percent of distributions received late in their
careers in order to maintain parity with what their benefits would have been under traditional DB
plans.
Finally, the evidence suggests that DC plans are indeed more risky, in the sense that the
variance of retirement income is greater than for DB plans.  However, the expected returns are
also higher, so that  DC plans provide higher levels of benefits in all but the bottom quintile of
the distribution of pension income.  We calculate that a typical worker who was continuously4
employed between ages 31 and 65 would prefer a randomly chosen DC plan from 1995 to a
randomly chosen DB plan from 1983, even with a coefficient of relative risk aversion as high as
12.
II. The Increasing Importance of Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans have experienced rapid growth in the past two decades.  The
percentage of workers listing DC plans as their primary pension has risen from 13 percent in
1975 to 33 percent in 1988 and 42 percent in 1993.   A large fraction of this growth comes from
the increase in coverage of 401(k) plans.  Participants in such plans grew from 19 percent of
active private sector participants in 1984 to 52 percent in 1993 (EBRI, 1997).   Papke (1997)
finds that some of the DC plan growth has come at the expense of terminated DB plans,
particularly among smaller employers who are most likely to find DB administrative costs
onerous.
Why have DC plans become so popular?  Beller and Lawrence (1992) identify three
factors that may have facilitated the shift from DB plans to DC plans.  The first factor is the
relative decline in employment at large, unionized manufacturing firms, which tend to favor DB
plans, relative to small, non-unionized service firms, which tend to favor DC plans.  The second
factor is the succession of legislation since the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) that has increased the relative cost and complexity of DB plans and enhanced the
tax advantages of DC plans.
1  The third factor is the growing acceptance of DC plans as saving
vehicles by employees themselves.  In particular, workers who expect to change jobs frequently
                                               
1 While both DB and DC plans are subject to nondiscrimination rules regarding the distribution of pension wealth
across employees, the employer’s responsibility for meeting the promised benefit payments under a DB plan
generates considerable regulations on the timing of the funding of those promises.  Some of those regulations,
combined with the recent bull market in equities, have prevented firms from making substantial contributions to DB
plans, thereby denying companies with DB plans current tax savings.5
over their careers might favor DC plans over DB plans because they provide access to better
benefits for short-term workers.  Each of these factors further suggests that the DC plan will
remain the dominant form of pension coverage for current and future generations of workers.
Will these emerging DC plans provide retirement benefits comparable to the DB plans
that they appear to be supplanting?  The enormous variation in pension plans across firms makes
answering this question difficult.  In a DB plan, the firm typically promises to pay the worker a
nominal annuity based on a set of formulas related to the worker’s age, years of service, and final
average pay.  These formulas vary considerably across pension plans (Gustman and Steinmeier,
1989).  Final average pay may be the average of the last few years of earnings but is more often
the average of the highest few years or the highest consecutive years during the last few years.
(The distinction matters when wages are stochastic or decline later in the work life.)  Many plans
specify a replacement rate per year of service, but the replacement rate varies substantially across
firms.
2  Other plans pay a flat rate of benefits in dollar terms per year of service worked
(Kotlikoff and Smith, 1983).
Some DB plans are also integrated with Social Security to varying degrees, and most
have more than one formula that can be operative for a given worker.  Finally, there are
differences in how DB plans treat early retirement, both in terms of what is considered a
“normal” retirement date and the extent to which benefits are reduced because of early
retirement.  This heterogeneity in DB plans thus makes it difficult to characterize what average
pension benefits would be in the DB “regime” prior to the rise of DC plans.
3
                                               
       2   For example, if the replacement rate is 1.5 percent per year of service and the number of years of service is 20,
the replacement rate would be 30 percent of final average pay.
     
3 The impact of these incentives on retirement from the firm has been demonstrated in various ways over the past
decade or so.  See, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Stock and Wise (1990), and Samwick (1998).
Woodbury (1997) discusses how the incentives in DB plans may actually be the consequence of efforts to ensure6
In contrast to DB plans, DC plans differ across firms along just a few dimensions.  The
first is whether the plan permits employee contribution rates and whether these contributions are
capped.  Some traditional DC plans are non-contributory, so that the employer funds the entire
pension.  The newer 401(k) plans are actually tax-deferred saving accounts in which employee
contributions play a central role.  The second dimension is the percent of the employee’s pay that
is contributed by the employer.  In 401(k) plans, there is often both a fixed contribution rate for
each employee plus a contribution that “matches” the employee’s contribution.  Match rates
typically range from $0.10 to $1.00 per dollar of employee contribution and may be capped.  A
common example is a 50 cents on the dollar match on the employee’s first six percent of salary
contributed.  The eventual benefits received by the worker will also vary across firms, and across
workers, based on both the portfolio allocations chosen by the firm or the  worker and the
investment returns received in those portfolios.  In the next section, we review our data source
from the Survey of Consumer Finances that allows us to capture and measure this heterogeneity
in both DB and DC plans.
III.  Modeling Retirement Benefits in the SCFs
Our estimates of pension benefits are based on the household data in the Surveys of
Consumer Finances (SCF) and the companion Pension Provider Surveys (PPS).  Conducted
triennially since 1983 by the Federal Reserve Board and other government agencies, the SCFs
are designed to provide a comprehensive survey of household wealth in the United States.  Each
survey collects detailed information on asset and debt holdings for both a representative cross-
section of households and a special sample of high-income households identified from tax
                                                                                                                                                      
fairness in replacement rates across different types of workers based on years of service and age rather than explicit
policies to manage turnover.7
returns.
4   For every respondent or spouse in the first (1983) SCF sample who reported being
covered by a pension, the PPS attempted to obtain the summary plan description for the plan
from the pension provider (usually the employer).  Approximately 73 percent of the workers
reporting coverage had valid data on their plans in the PPS.
5
We view the trend toward DC plans that began in the early 1980s as a change of regimes
in which the typical worker who is covered by a pension will now have benefits determined by a
DC plan rather than a DB plan.  In order to assess what this regime change means for future
retirement income, we sample plans in 1983, the earliest date during the transition for which we
have comprehensive data on DB pension plans.  As the transition continued, the characteristics
of the sample of remaining DB plans changed considerably.  The weaker plans were likely
supplanted by the newer 401(k) plans, as noted above (Papke, 1997).  Examining a sample of DB
plans, such as those in the PPS from 1989, would overstate the generosity of DB plans before the
transition began.
There have also been changes in the characteristics of DC plans during the transition.  As
the latest survey year, the sample of DC plans available in 1995 provides the best
characterization of a future pension landscape in which DC plans are the dominant source of
pension incomes.  Because the benefits received from DC pension plans are so dependent on
contribution rates and investment returns, we characterize each DC pension plan by the self-
reported investment allocation and contribution rates in the SCF.
6  Our main comparison will be
                                               
     
4Descriptions of the SCF 1983 are provided in Avery et al. (1984a, b).
     
5 We impute plans to those respondents whose plans were not sampled in the PPS according to the methodology
discussed in Appendix B.
    
 6 An alternative would be to use the actual DC plans reported in the 1989 PPS.  We do not follow this approach
for two reasons.  First, this vintage of plans may not be sufficiently recent to accurately reflect DC pension plans at
the end of the trend toward DC plans.  Second, and more importantly, it is not clear that this PPS includes 401(k)8
between DB plans in the 1983 PPS and DC plans in the 1995 SCF.
The original documentation for the PPS in Curtin (1987) contains template programs that
convert the PPS data into formulas to compute benefit entitlements under each plan.  These
original programs allow flexibility only in specifying economy-wide parameters for inflation, the
interest rate, and productivity growth.  As discussed in Appendix C, we have revised the original
formulas based on Samwick (1993a, b) to allow for individual-specific investment allocations,
stochastic wage profiles, and stochastic investment returns.  These revisions allow us to compute
pension entitlements accurately under a wide range of economic conditions for any observed or
hypothetical worker.
IV.  Simulation Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology for characterizing the entire distribution of
pension benefits from both DB and DC plans taking into account variation (for a given worker)
in earnings and asset returns and variation (across workers) in the types of pension plans
available.  For DB plans, the annual benefit payment is typically specified in nominal terms and
may change over time (such as providing an extra benefit in years before Social Security benefits
are available).  We therefore calculate the actuarial present value of the benefits and convert this
actuarial present value into a constant, real annuity beginning at the age of retirement.
7  For DC
plans, we compute the constant, real annuity that could be supported by the balance in the
account as of the retirement date.  The real interest rate used in these calculations is 3 percent.
                                                                                                                                                      
plans in its definition of DC plans.  Given the widespread use of 401(k) plans as the sole source of employer-
provided pension benefits, this is an important caveat.
     
7Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1992) report that firms accounting for 26 percent of workers gave ad hoc
increases in pension benefits to account for inflation between 1983-1987.  The probability of receiving such ad hoc
adjustments is not reflected in our calculations.  However, all pension plan formulas have been modified as in
Samwick (1993a) so that dollar amounts specified in nominal terms are indexed to nominal wage growth.9
We specify pension benefits for worker i as  ) , , (
~ ~
T r y G B i i i i = .   In this expression, T is the
number of years of eligible service, 
~
i y is a 1xT vector of earnings for individual i, and  i r
~
 is a
1xT vector of returns that depends on the individual’s portfolio allocation as well as the rates of
return on the underlying assets.  The function Gi represents how the individual’s pension plan
maps earnings, rates of return, and years of service into the pension benefit.  For ease of
exposition, Gi represents all of the plans for which a worker is eligible on his current job.  In our
sample, there are individuals with the same employer who are covered by the same pensions and
multiemployer plans that cover workers from several different employers.
Clearly, both earnings and rates of return are stochastic, so each worker may face
considerable uncertainty about his benefits at retirement.   The probability that worker i receives
retirement benefits from his pension plan that are less than a given level B is written:
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where Fi(B) is the probability of observing vectors 
~
i y  and  i r
~
 such that the resulting pension
benefit is less than a given level B.
The nature of our counterfactual experiment is to calculate pension benefits for each
worker under two different pension scenarios.  In the first scenario, workers are covered by their
actual pension plans from the 1983 survey.  In the second scenario, we take the same universe of
workers (those with DB plans in 1983) and assign each a randomly chosen DC pension plan
from the 1995 survey.  In both scenarios, the realizations of earnings and asset returns are
identical for each worker.  Suppose that the new DC plan can be characterized by a new function
Gi
*, with benefits equal to  ) , , (
~ ~
* * T r y G B i i i i = .  We can also write the distribution function for this10
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For a given worker, a comparison of these two distribution functions (Fi and Fi
*)
determines whether his real annuitized pension benefit is as large under the new DC plan as
under the original 1983 plan.  Since our objective is to compare the entire panoply of pension
plans by vintage (DB plans in 1983 versus DC plans in 1995), we integrate over all plans in a
given vintage to form an overall distribution function:
( ) ) (
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with a similar expression for F
*(B), where the sample weight of observation i in our sample is
given by  i p .
We compare the distributions F(B) and F
*(B) in two ways.  First, we can compute the
expected value of pension benefits implied by each distribution:
( ) ( ) ( ) T r y G E B E i i i
N
i
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=
= p               (4)
with a similar expression for E
*(B).  Second, we also compare the distributions at various
percentiles.  The following condition,
( ) ( ) z F z F
1 * 1 - - <          (5)
implies that the benefit received at the z
th percentile from the F(B) distribution is lower than the
benefit received at the same percentile from the F
*(B) distribution.  If the inequality holds, then
F
*(B) is preferred to F(B) at the z
th percentile.
Because we do not observe the entire history of earnings and asset returns, we proceed by
making reasonable assumptions about the distribution of these variables.  We assume that the11
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where ln(yit) is the natural logarithm of earnings yit, which is assumed to follow a random walk
with a quartic drift in age, represented by Xit.
8   For computational simplicity, we ignore
transitory shocks to earnings.
9
The randomness in earnings is characterized by the T-1 vector of error terms {eit}.  Note
that there are only T-1 error terms because information from the cross-sectional survey provides
us with earnings in one year. We project earnings forward using these error terms (i.e., given
earnings in year t, eit+1 yields yit+1).  Because we do not have a complete wage history, we also
project earnings back using analogous error terms (given earnings in year t, eit determines yit-1,
and successively back to ei2, which determines yi1).
Computing the expected pension benefits even for DB plans, which do not explicitly
depend on interest rates, requires the evaluation of a T-1 dimensional integral over all of the
shocks to earnings.  Since the dimensionality corresponds to the years of service, it is not
possible to evaluate this integral analytically.  As an alternative, we simulate the probability
distribution of earnings through simulated “draws” of T-1 independent values of eit from N(0,s
2).
                                               
    
 8 The age-related components of earnings growth were estimated from the March 1983 Current Population
Survey by regressing the logarithm of annual earnings on age, age
2, age
3, and age
4 for full-time, white male workers.
Murphy and Welch (1990) show that a quartic specification matches the empirical age pattern of earnings more
accurately than the more typical quadratic specification using just age and age
2, which tends to overstate the
reduction or reversal of real wage growth near retirement.
        9 Omitting transitory shocks will make DB plans appear less risky than they actually are, as most of them
calculate benefits based on a short average of earnings at the end of the working years where transitory shocks might
play an important role.  In contrast, under DC plans and a minority of DB plans, retirement income is based on a
long average of earnings at the firm, so that transitory shocks will on balance have little effect on retirement income
and their omission is inconsequential.12
Together with the actual reported earnings in the survey year, we can construct the worker’s
entire earnings history for each simulated draw.  The worker is assumed fully employed during
the entire T years, although we allow the worker to switch jobs or retire early in some of our
simulations.  For our basic analysis, we have the worker retire at age 65.  When we standardize
the working career across workers to investigate the effects of turnover, we set T = 35, so the
worker is employed from age 31 to 65.  We set s = 0.10 in equation (6) meaning that the
standard deviation of the (permanent) innovation in log earnings is 0.10.
10   Economy-wide real
earnings growth is assumed to be 1.5 percent annually, and the inflation rate is assumed to be 3
percent.
Estimating the benefits provided by DC plans also requires us to specify a process
governing asset returns.  The vector of returns ~ ri  over the T years depends on the portfolio of
assets held and the rates of return on each asset.   Suppose there are M different types of assets,
with a 1xM vector of weights qi, which are assumed to be constant over time for a given
worker.
11  The 1xT vector of returns ~ ri  is written as a weighted average of the asset-specific
returns, ~ ri  = qi i r ~ .  The MxT matrix of asset-specific returns  i r ~
 is written (dropping the
subscript i for legibility):
                                               
     
10Using a large sample of individual labor market histories taken from the Social Security earnings records of
young men, Topel and Ward (1992) find that the evolution of wages within jobs closely approximates a random
walk.  They estimate the standard deviation of the permanent innovation in log earnings to be about 13 percent.
Using similar methods but earnings histories of workers of all ages from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Samwick (1993a) also obtains an estimate of approximately 13 percent.
     
11 Portfolio weights are estimated from the self-reported data on asset allocation of retirement accounts in the
SCFs from 1989 (imputed to DC plans in 1983, when the SCF does not collect investment allocation data) and 1995.
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Rather than characterizing the structure of asset returns parametrically, we simulate  i r ~
by using random draws of the actual returns received in years from 1901-1990.  We follow
Siegel (1992) and distinguish between three types of assets: short-term bonds, long-term bonds,
and stocks (M = 3).  A given worker will maintain the same asset weights throughout his life,
and for all simulated draws from the sample of asset returns.  As a working assumption, we
assume that the asset returns and error terms from the wage distribution are uncorrelated.
12
We require a sufficiently large number of simulated draws to provide an accurate
characterization of the distribution functions F(B) and F
*(B).  One approach would be to sample
each worker K times, and then use population weights provided in the SCF to weight the
resulting distributions by  i p , the sample population weight from Equation (3).  The main
disadvantage of this approach is that it uses the same number of simulated draws for a worker
with a small weight as for a worker with a very large weight.
Our approach is instead to set the number of simulation draws to be proportional to the
sample weights, pi.  When these sample weights are summed over all households, they equal the
total number of households in the U.S. population in a given year (or, for our subsample, the
number of households with DB plans in 1983).  The number of draws chosen is written Ki =
integer{p*pi}, where p is our overall sampling frequency.  For example, if p = 1/1000 and
individual i’s population weight p i = 25,000, we simulate 25 different earnings and asset
                                               
     
12  We do not allow for serial correlation in the asset returns, so that the years of historical returns are assumed to
be i.i.d.  We have tested for the robustness of our results to this assumption by also sampling asset returns in five-
year “blocks” with replacement, so it would be possible for a single individual to sample the years (say) 1929-33
and then 1930-34.   The results were similar to those reported below.14
“histories,” and hence generate 25 different realizations of pension benefits for this particular
worker.
V.  Empirical Results
In the 4,103 households in the 1983 SCF, there are 1,489 workers who report being
covered by a pension at their current employers and whose plans (up to four per worker) are
found in the PPS.  Because many individuals may participate in the same plan, the total number
of different plans used is 928.  There are an additional 221 workers who report being covered
only by a thrift plan, which were not included in the PPS.  We code thrift plans as pensions that
simply accumulate employee and employer contributions.  There are also 552 workers who
report coverage in a pension plan but whose plans are not found in the PPS.  These workers were
assigned a pension plan according to the imputation procedure described in Appendix B.  Using
sample weights, there are 44.85 million workers covered by pensions.  Our 1/1000 sampling rate
yields a total of 46,045 sample observations (the discrepancy is due to rounding error and
needing at least one sample observation for respondents with sample weights less than 1000).
13
Increasing the sampling rate to 1/100 did not affect our results.
 Sample means for individual characteristics relevant for computing expected pension
benefits are given in the first column of numbers in Table 1.  The average worker covered by a
pension in 1983 was 42 years old and was earning $23,600 annually (in 1983 dollars) after an
average of 11 years on the job.  Workers who made voluntary contributions to DC pension plans
(i.e., those who would be represented in the PPS) gave an average of 5.56 percent of their
earnings.  Workers covered by thrift plans (i.e., those not represented in the PPS) contributed
approximately 4 percent of earnings, as did their employers.  In our simulations that investigate
                                               
     
13Tabulations of coverage among full-time workers using the May 1983 Current Population Survey suggest a
range of 40.28-44.76 million workers in pensions (see Congressional Budget Office, 1987).15
the effects of job turnover, we standardize the characteristics of the workers to reflect these
average characteristics, as shown in the second column of the table.  The use of this benchmark
“representative agent” also allows us to control for the impact of worker heterogeneity on
pension variation and return.
Information on the investment allocation of DC plans was not collected in the SCF 1983.
In subsequent surveys, respondents were asked about the allocations in the largest three of up to
four accounts.  The respondents could indicate whether the account was invested “mostly or all
in stock,” “mostly or all in interest earning assets,” or “split between these.”
 14  We assigned
shares of stocks equal to 100, 0, and 50 percent, respectively, for these responses.  We randomly
assign allocations from the SCF 1989 to respondents in the SCF 1983 and use the allocations
reported in the SCF 1995 for the sample of matched DC plans.  The reported allocations in stock
for these two years are presented in Table 2.  The share in stocks increased substantially between
the two years, suggesting a more aggressive investing strategy in 1995.
As discussed above, we use the sample of returns on stocks, short-term corporate bonds,
and long-term corporate bonds for the 1901-1990 period from Siegel (1992) to simulate the
stochastic returns on DC accounts.  Summary statistics for the real returns are presented in Table
3.  The first row of the table shows that stocks had an average annual real return of 7.95 percent
per year, compared to 1.58 percent for long-term bonds and 0.75 percent for short-term bonds.
The remainder of the table presents other summary statistics on the distribution of returns,
including the correlation matrix.  Stocks clearly provide the highest average returns and the most
risky returns.
15  In our imputations of investment allocations, we assume that all “interest-
                                               
     
14The proceeds of the fourth account were assumed to be invested in the same proportions as the other three in
our simulations.  All miscellaneous investment allocations were classified as “interest bearing.”
     
15We may understate total asset variability to the extent that DC plan enrollees sink a large fraction of their16
bearing” assets are evenly divided between short-term and long-term bonds.  We also assume
constant portfolio shares, implying an annual rebalancing of pension accounts.
Our main source of comparisons will be between the pension benefits that could be
expected from the 1983 vintage of plans and the benefits that could be expected from the 1995
vintage of DC plans.  We assign each 1983 worker a randomly chosen DC plan from the SCF
1995.  Each “plan” from 1995 includes the investment allocation discussed above and the
reported employee and employer contributions.  We restrict our attention to DC plans described
by respondents as involving “tax-deferred savings accounts,” such as 401(k) and other thrift
plans.
Approximately 27.8 percent of the workers in the SCF 1995 were covered by such a DC
plan, up from 18.0 percent in the 1989 SCF.  Although the sampling frames are slightly different,
these coverage rates are consistent with those from the CPS for the 1988 and 1993.  (We present
a full comparison of the two surveys in Appendix A.)  In 1995, 78.8 percent of the covered
workers made a contribution to their plans.  The average employee contribution rate (including
those who did not contribute) was 5.3 percent of earnings, and the average dollar contribution
was $2,502.  The average percent contributed by employers was 5.0 with an average dollar value
of $2,160.
The results of our counterfactual simulations are presented in Table 4.  The top panel
presents the mean, median, 10
th percentile, 90
th percentile, and standard deviation of pension
benefits for actual workers in the SCF 1983 assuming they continue working on their current
jobs until age 65.  The workers covered only by DB plans only can expect an average of $10,553
in retirement benefits if they continue to work until age 65.  If these same workers with identical
                                                                                                                                                      
pension fund in just one or two stocks or bonds, rather than the market averages as we are assuming.17
earnings histories are given randomly chosen DC plans, their expected pension benefits are
$25,275.  (All values are in 1983 dollars.  Multiply by 1.61 for 1997 dollars.)  The disparity is
less severe at the medians, with the worker receiving $7,214 and $10,841 under the DB and DC
plans, respectively.  A comparison of the means and medians suggests a more skewed
distribution of DC benefits in the upper tail, which is borne out in a comparison of the 90
th
percentiles ($58,415 for DC versus $23,150 for DB).  At the 10
th percentile of the distribution,
benefits are higher under the DB plans ($1,162 for DC versus $1,461 for DB).
16  Figure 1 shows
the full distribution function for the DB and DC plans. Note that DB plans dominate DC plans in
the bottom quintile of the distribution, but  the difference is only $299 annually at the 10
th
percentile.
The remaining columns of Table 4 examine the sensitivity of our results.   One possibility
is that future stock market returns will not be as high as those from 1900 - 1990.  Column 3
compares the returns to the 1995 DC plans when the rate of return on equity is reduced by 3
percent, from an average of 7.95 to 4.95 percent.  (Given the share of bonds and stocks in 1995,
this translates to a return averaged over all workers of 3.5 percent.)   While DC pension benefits
are not so generous under this scenario, the mean ($15,751) and median ($7,943) still exceed
those for the DB plan.  Another possibility is that our earnings uncertainty is too high.  Columns
4 and 5 consider the case where uncertainty in earnings innovations is lowered to a log standard
error of 0.05.  While the median DB pension is somewhat higher, the median DC pension is also
                                               
   
16 Our omission of Social Security benefits from the distribution of pension benefits has two effects on the
comparisons of income distributions.  First, in 1983, some public sector workers are not covered by Social Security.
Their DB plans are designed to provide a replacement rate comparable to the combined Social Security and pension
benefits of a private sector worker.  This leads to an upward bias in the estimated DB benefits at the mean and
higher percentiles.  Second, among private sector plans, many are explicitly integrated with Social Security such that
higher Social Security benefits are offset by lower pension benefits.  Omitting Social Security from the retirement
income would overstate the riskiness of these offset plans.  Since DB plans are found to have both lower average
benefits and lower variability of benefits, the omission does not change the qualitative comparisons that we make.18
higher.  The degree of earnings uncertainty does not appear to be a crucial issue for these
comparisons.  Finally, Columns 6 and 7 show the comparisons when productivity growth is
assumed to be 2.5 percent annually.  A higher productivity growth gives a greater edge to DB
plans, since benefits are typically tied to the last few years of earnings.  However, pension
benefits are still substantially larger for DC plans, although the difference in benefits at the
bottom of the distribution ($1,651 for DB plans and $1,199 for DC plans) are more pronounced.
Some of the DB plans from 1983 included supplemental DC plans.   In separate
simulations, we included these hybrid DB/DC plans in the universe of DB plans and performed
the same counterfactual as in Table 4 by giving them randomly chosen DC plans from 1995.
The combination DB/DC plans, which comprise about one-fourth of all DB plans, tended to be
more generous than straight DB plans in 1983, so the median and mean benefits are higher,
$8,889 and $15,499.  However, because those receiving these plans also were better
compensated than the average DB employee was, benefits for this group under a matched DC
plan were also higher, with median and means of $11,743 and $27,254.  Like the results in Table
4, the 90
th percentile for DC plans were substantially higher ($62,362 versus $33,418) and the
10
th percentile slightly lower ($1,410 versus $1,784).
Our assumption above that people work full time until age 65 is clearly an
oversimplification.  Table 5 shows how allowing for early retirement or later starting ages of
pension coverage affects pension benefits.  To address these issues, we want to abstract from
differences across individuals in their age cohort and lifetime earnings.  Instead, we use a single
benchmark or representative worker who was age 42 in 1983 and earned $23,600.  Other
parameters are as shown in the second column of Table 1.   Thus, all variation in retirement
benefits is the consequence of heterogeneous pension plans, contribution rates, and investment19
allocations from the SCF and PPS and random earnings and asset returns for each observation.
Columns 1 and 2 present the distribution of pension benefits for the standard case where the
representative individual works from 31 to 65.  The difference between the standard deviation of
DB pension plan benefits in Column 1 of Table 5 ($8,254) and the standard deviation in Column
1 of Table 5 ($10,994) is that the latter distribution also reflects the cross-sectional variation in
1983 earnings for the universe of workers with DB plans.  Note that for the benchmark worker in
Table 5, DC plans dominate DB plans even at the 10
th percentile.
Because the benchmark comparisons focus on a single worker, we can make expected
utility comparisons between the distributions of DB and DC plan benefits.  Using a constant
relative risk aversion expected utility function, we computed the expected utility of each
distribution under the assumption that the worker had income only from Social Security benefits
(based on the same random earnings draws that generate the pension benefits) for a single retiree
and the pension benefit.   The expected utility of the distribution from the DC plans dominated
utility from the DB plans for all values of relative risk aversion up to and including 12. An
alternative comparison is to compute the percentage increase in DB benefits that would have to
be applied to the entire distribution that would leave the worker indifferent between the two
distributions.  For coefficients of relative risk aversion of 3 and 5, these percentages were 67
percent and 52 percent, respectively.  In other words, for a typical worker with reasonable
amounts of risk aversion, the shift from DB to DC pensions has resulted in an increase in
expected utility equal to a one-half to two-thirds increase in pension benefits.
17
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 show the effects of early retirement at age 55 on the
                                               
   
17 A similar exercise can be performed for the counterfactual exercise shown in Table 4 and Figure 1.  In this case
DC plans are preferred to DB plans for relative risk aversion measures up to 5.   But it is not clear that these
distributions can be compared in a utility framework, given that the “uncertainty” in retirement outcomes reflects in
part heterogeneity among workers.20
comparisons between DB and DC plans.  Early retirement (or movement into “bridge jobs”) is in
fact encouraged by the early retirement incentives in DB pension plans (Kotlikoff and Wise,
1987).  Pension benefits are lower in all cases, but the overall comparisons across plan types
remain the same.   Some DB plans provide little incentive to retire at age 55, which explains why
the 10
th percentile benefits ($897) are so much lower than those for DC plans ($1,637).   We also
consider what happens if workers do not make retirement saving a priority until late or midway
through their careers.   Like the previous results, DC plans generally dominate DB plans for jobs
that start at age 42 with retirement at age 65, shown in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.  But for jobs
beginning at age 53 and ending at age 65, where the differences between the two types of
pensions are less pronounced (Columns 7 and 8), DC plans still tend to dominate DB plans.
Lastly, we address the issue of how job turnover affects the accumulation of pension
benefits at retirement.  Two considerations are important in this regard.  First, because DB
pensions are backloaded—providing greater marginal rewards for another year of service at
higher tenures—they penalize early turnover substantially.  Second, workers often do not roll
over their DC balances from previous jobs into similar tax-preferred saving vehicles when they
change jobs. A recent EBRI (1997) study reported that only 42 percent of workers rolled all or
part of their lump sum distribution into an IRA, with another 8 percent moving their assets into
their new employer’s plan.  Workers who spend their lump-sum disbursements could therefore
experience a marked attenuation in their retirement income.
To assess the importance of this leakage, we consider two scenarios in Table 6.  In the
first, workers start work at age 31 and quit that job at age 42.  By working 11 years, they will
almost always have earned some vested benefits under a DB plans, since the most prominent
vesting schedule was full vesting after 10 years of service.  In the second, employees start work21
at age 42 and work until age 53.  For both scenarios, we characterize the distribution of pension
wealth at the job transition.  This represents the actuarial present value of vested benefits for DB
plans and the balance in the account for DC plans.
The first thing to note is that short job spells at younger ages typically generate low
benefits from DB plans.  The comparisons to DC plans are less favorable than in the earlier
scenarios in which the worker stayed through age 55 or 65.  At ages 31 to 42 (Columns 1 through
3), mean DB wealth is only 26 percent of mean DC wealth; the ratio of medians is even lower.
Looking at the job from ages 42 to 53 (Columns 4 through 6), mean DB wealth is still just 46
percent of DC wealth.  In order to maintain parity with the DB plans, workers need only save
one-fourth of distributions received early in their careers and one-half of distributions received
later in their careers.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998) report that the probability of reinvesting lump-sum
distributions based on the 1993 CPS rises steadily with age and is 48 percent for those age 35 to
44, 57 percent for those age 45 to 54, and 73 percent for those age 55 to 64.  While this is a
somewhat different calculation than the fraction of each distribution that is reinvested, the figures
are substantially above the amounts that we calculate are necessary to match what was offered to
short tenure workers by traditional DB plans.  And this comparison considers only the effect of
the distributions on future retirement income—it does not account for the workers benefiting
from actually spending that money or using it to pay off mortgages, rather than having it revert to
employers under DB plans.
VI.  Are Workers Really Better Off Under DC Plans?
One important limitation of our analysis is that we focus just on retirement benefits and
not on the general equilibrium wage and saving effects that could occur as DC plans cover a22
larger fraction of workers.  Standard economic theory would suggest that, tax issues aside, the
form of the pension program is irrelevant to the worker’s retirement security.  What matters is
the total compensation package of the worker, which includes both wages and fringe benefits.
Any changes in the magnitude and risk characteristics of the pension plan can be neutralized by
the appropriate adjustment to net wages and the non-pension wealth of the worker.  For example,
a shift from a DB plan funded by the employer to a DC plan funded entirely by employee
contributions has a first-order impact on the overall wage of the worker.  To keep compensation
constant, employers increase the gross wage by the amount they had previously contributed to
the DB pension fund.  In this case, the bias goes against DC plans, since increasing gross
earnings in the DC counterfactual would also increase simulated DC benefits.
Suppose, however, that firms understood that DC plans provided generally superior
benefits to employees at retirement.  In this case, firms could respond by reducing wages while
keeping the overall compensation package the same.   But for this effect to dominate the opposite
bias noted above, it would have to be the case that DB plans yield lower retirement benefits than
the DC plans counting only employer contributions.
18  Simulations (not reported) suggest the
opposite; the reason why DC plans generally dominate DB plans is because of the additional
employee contribution.  Thus, we argue that at least for these general equilibrium effects, the net
effect is to bias downward our estimated net pension benefits for DC plans.
Another possibility is that the expansion of DC plans has been associated with a general
downward trend in the generosity of employer-provided pensions.  Thus, DC pension benefits in
the future could be worse than projected based on 1995 survey data.  To test for this trend, we
first simulated pension benefits for the universe of people with DC plans in the 1983 SCF.   We
                                               
   
18 The employer can cut wages in the DC world only if the employer contribution to the DC plan yields higher
benefits than the status quo DB plan.  Otherwise the worker would be worse off.23
then took those same people, with identical earnings and asset return realizations, and gave them
random 1995 DC plans.   Median benefits for 1983 DC plans were $8,000, compared to $12,079
for 1995 DC plans.  Similarly, both the mean ($19,443 versus $28,948) and the 10
th percentile
($780 and $1,297) were higher for the 1995 plans.  In short, characteristics of plans available in
1995 appear to offer better retirement benefits than plans in 1983.
It could also be the case that workers are simply saving less in non-pension form as a
response to the increased employee contributions.  For example, suppose a worker in a 1983 DB
plan was saving an additional 10 percent of earnings for retirement.  By 1995, the worker no
longer has a DB plan, but contributes 5 percent to her 401(k) and is saving 5 percent. In this case,
there is a complete offset between taxable saving and tax-deferred saving, suggesting no better
financial security (aside from a tax break) despite the higher apparent retirement pension
balances.
Unfortunately, this story—that workers with pensions are no better prepared for their
retirement than they were in 1983—is difficult to evaluate with the available data, given other
changes in the economic environment since then.  (A simpler question, whether workers with
401(k) accounts reduce their non-pension saving as a consequence, is still mired in debate.
19)
Thus, we must limit our question (and answer) to one that compares actual retirement benefits
under a DB regime and those under a DC regime.
VI.  Conclusion
The surprisingly rapid increase in the number of defined contribution pension plans raises
an obvious question: will such plans provide adequate retirement income security compared to
the previously dominant defined benefit plans?   We have addressed this question using a large
                                               
   
19 For example, see Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996), and Hubbard and Skinner
(1996).24
sample of workers and detailed information on their pension plans from the Surveys of Consumer
Finances from 1983 and 1995.  Our results suggest that the typical DC plan in 1995 does a better
job on average of providing for retirement pension benefits than the typical DB plan from 1983.
This result is robust to a number of specifications.  For example, some workers spend
their lump-sum distributions from DC plans when they switch jobs.  While spending down such
plans reduces retirement income, we show that workers can spend 50 percent of their DC plan
assets when they switch jobs and still enjoy a nearly equivalent retirement income as under the
DB plan regime.   Furthermore, employees under DC plans get to spend their pension benefits,
while employees under DB plans simply forego most of their potential benefits.
What about workers who neglect to contribute to 401(k) plans altogether? It is true that a
large number of workers fail to contribute to their 401(k) plans.  However, the ones who fail to
contribute typically have an alternative plan, such as a DB pension; the 401(k) is simply a
supplemental plan.  In Samwick and Skinner (1997), we estimated that only 2-4 percent of all
workers are offered 401(k) plans to which they fail to contribute and have no alternative pension
plan.
Defined contribution plans appear to expose workers to more risk from stock and bond
rates of return.  But because the mean is also higher, the distribution of pension benefits under
1995 DC plans is generally preferred to the distribution of pension benefits under 1983 DB
plans.  Nevertheless, DC plans do slightly worse than DB plans for the bottom 20 percent of
retirement pension benefits, on the order of $300 annually at the 10
th percentile.  Still, when we
consider the case of a benchmark worker, the distribution of DC benefits are preferred to the
distribution of DB benefits for a measure of relative risk aversion as high as 12.
One limitation of our study is that we have not conducted multi-dimensional sensitivity25
analysis.  For example, suppose that the rate of return on stocks is lower than historical returns,
and individuals increase borrowing against or spending down their 401(k) balances.  Then more
current employees could find themselves worse off than under the older style DB plan.
20
Another limitation is that we have not addressed the difference in how pension benefits are paid
out; DB plan benefits are often provided as annuities, while DC plan benefits are typically lump-
sum payments to retirees.   Nevertheless, our results suggest that the trend toward defined
contribution plans has strengthened, not eroded, the retirement security of future retirees.
                                               
   
20 This assumes, of course, that the firm can meet its DB obligations, which would become questionable if asset
returns fell significantly.26
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Characteristics of Covered Population in the SCF 1983
Characteristic Sample Average Benchmark Worker
Date of Birth 1941.66 1941.50
Date of Hire 1972.74 1972.50
Annual Earnings (1983 $) 23584.03 23600.00
Annual Hours of Work 2058.91 2080.00
Percent Female 39.53 0.00
Contributions to Thrift Plans
   Employee (percent) 3.96 4.00
   Employer (percent) 4.07 4.00
Voluntary Contributions to
DC Plans (if positive)
 5.56 5.00
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1983.
2) All statistics reflect the weighted sample of households covered by a pension or thrift plan and
     include households for which pension plans were imputed.31
Table 2
Share of Retirement Accounts in Equity in SCFs 1989 and 1995
1995 1989
None 17.47 33.19
Under 50 percent 1.52 3.45
Exactly 50 percent 41.06 35.70
Over 50 percent 4.33 1.08
All 35.62 26.58
Notes:
1) Responses are tabulated for the question in the SCF: “How is the money in this account
invested? Is it mostly in stocks, mostly in interest earning assets, is it split between these, or
what?”  Possible answers are:
a) Mostly or all stock; stock in company
b) Mostly or all interest earning; guaranteed; cash; bank account
c) Split between stock and interest earning assets
d) Real estate
e) Insurance / Retirement plan
f) Other
2) Responses (a) and (c) are imputed at 100 and 50 percent, respectively.  All other responses
are imputed at 0 percent.  Intermediate values may occur if respondents have more than one
account and invest them differently.
3) The SCF 1995 is used for the matched sample of DC plans.  The SCF 1989 is used for the
sample of 1983 DC plans.32
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics on Real Asset Returns, 1901-1990
Short-Term Bonds Long-Term Bonds Stocks
Mean 0.75 1.58 7.95
Standard Deviation 4.88 9.35 20.62
Maximum 17.38 35.12 75.59
90th Percentile 2.99 6.60 21.12
Median 1.25 1.01 8.99
10th Percentile -1.23 -4.51 -6.12
Minimum -15.07 -16.74 -42.64
Correlation with:
  Short-Term Bonds 1.00
  Long-Term Bonds 0.66 1.00
  Stocks 0.17 0.32 1.00
Notes:
1) Source: Authors’ tabulations based on Siegel (1992).
2) All returns reflect the real holding period returns on the market portfolio of each type of
    security: short-term corporate bonds, long-term corporate bonds, and corporate equities.33
Table 4
Pension Benefit Distributions for DB plan, Counterfactual Case
Baseline Assumptions Uncertainty Lowered to 5% Productivity Increased to 2.5%
1983 DB Only Matched DC 1983 DB Only Matched DC 1983 DB Only Matched DC
Asset Returns Historical Equity – 3% Historical Historical
Mean 10,553 25,275 15,751 10,330 25,389 13,106 26,370
Median 7,214 10,841 7,943 7,681 11,208 8,768 11,403
10
th Percentile 1,461 1,162 966 1,618 1,200 1,651 1,199
90
th Percentile 23,150 58,415 36,493 22,218 58,667 29,859 61,482
Std. Deviation 10,994 52,254 26,171 9,414 51,745 13,706 53,159
Notes:
1) All amounts are in 1983 dollars (CPI97/CPI83 = 1.61) and represent the level of constant, real annuities payable at retirement
based on the actuarial present value of DB pension benefits or the balance in the DC pension account.
2) The left column in each panel is the distribution of pension benefits from the actual sample of plans covering the SCF 1983 sample
      respondents.  The right column is the distribution of pension benefits from the matched sample of 1995 DC plans.
3)  The 1983 sample of 46,045 observations is 60.2 percent DB plan only, 17.4 percent DC only, and 22.4 percent with a combination
      of DB and DC plans.
4)  The baseline assumptions assume a 10% standard deviation of the permanent shock to earnings each year, a 1.5% rate of annual
      productivity growth, and a retirement age of 65.34
Table 5
Pension Benefit Distributions for Different Careers, Benchmark Case
Full Career: Age 31 to 65 Retire Early: Age 31 to 55 Start at 42: Age 42 to 65 Start at 53: Age 53 to 65
1983 DB Matched DC 1983 DB Matched DC 1983 DB Matched DC 1983 DB Matched DC
Mean 11,273 24,068 4,333 8,352 7,818 12,382 4,044 4,843
Median 8,848 15,184 3,562 6,020 6,179 8,689 3,202 3,545
10
th Percentile 3,416 3,702 897 1,637 2,518 2,315 1,157 995
90
th Percentile 21,609 52,363 8,528 17,448 14,823 26,495 7,627 10,264
Std. Deviation 8,254 30,695 3,583 8,319 5,687 12,834 3,142 4,478
Notes:
1) All amounts are in 1983 dollars (CPI97/CPI83 = 1.61) and represent the level of constant, real annuities payable at retirement
based on the actuarial present value of DB pension benefits or the balance in the DC pension account.
2) The left column in each panel is the distribution of pension benefits from the actual sample of plans covering the SCF 1983 sample
      respondents.  The right column is the distribution of pension benefits from the matched sample of 1995 DC plans.
3) The 1983 sample of 46,045 observations is 60.2 percent DB plan only, 17.4 percent DC only, and 22.4 percent with a combination
      of DB and DC plans.
4) The baseline assumptions assume a 10% standard deviation of the permanent shock to earnings each year, a 1.5% rate of annual
      productivity growth, and historical rates of return on assets.35
Table 6
Pension Wealth at Turnover Before Retirement, Benchmark Case
Early Career Job: Age 31 to 42 Middle Career Job: Age 42 to 53
1983 DB Only Matched DC DB/DC (%) 1983 DB Only Matched DC DB/DC (%)
Mean 8,938 34,766 25.71 20,003 43,473 46.01
Median 5,565 27,510 20.23 14,366 34,587 41.54
10
th Percentile 0 8,548 0.00 2,849 10,392 27.42
90
th Percentile 20,293 70,635 28.73 41,944 89,368 46.93
Std. Deviation 13,031 27,513 20,446 34,230
Notes:
1) All amounts are in 1983 dollars (CPI97/CPI83 = 1.61) and represent the level of the actuarial present value of vested DB pension
benefits or the balance in the DC pension account at turnover.
2) The left column in each panel is the distribution of pension wealth from the actual sample of plans covering the SCF 1983 sample
      respondents.  The middle column is the distribution of pension wealth from the matched sample of 1995 DC plans.  The right
      column is the ratio of the DB wealth to the DC wealth.
3) The 1983 sample of 46,045 observations is 60.2 percent DB plan only, 17.4 percent DC only, and 22.4 percent with a combination
      of DB and DC plans.
4) The baseline assumptions assume a 10% standard deviation of the permanent shock to earnings each year, a 1.5% rate of annual
      productivity growth, and historical rates of return on assets.36
Appendix A: Correspondence Between the SCF and the Current Population Survey
Summary statistics for those contribution rates from the 1989, 1992, and 1995 SCFs are
presented in Table A.1.  Also presented are tabulations for 1988 and 1993 from the Current
Population Survey Employee Benefits Supplements from EBRI (1994).
21
The first three rows show that approximately 27.8 percent of the workers in the SCF 1995
were covered by a DC plan, up from 21.0 percent in the SCF 1992 and 18.0 percent in the SCF
1989.   The next rows describe the rates and levels of employee contributions.  In 1995, 78.8
percent of the covered workers made a contribution to their plans, down from 81.4 percent in
1989.  The CPS numbers show the same trend but at a lower level.  Average employee
contributions (including those who did not contribute) were 5.3 percent of earnings or $2,502 in
1995 and totaled $71.8 billion in aggregate.  The CPS 1993 shows a slightly lower contribution
rate of 4.9 percent and $1,971 on average and a much lower aggregate total of $49.6 billion.
22
Other years match up more closely between the SCF and CPS samples.
According to the SCF in 1995, 72.3 percent of employers made contributions.  The
average percent contributed was 5.0 percent, with an average dollar value of $2,160 and
aggregate contributions of $62.0 billion.  The EBRI (1994) tabulations do not present employer
contributions explicitly, but they do provide a range for the percent of employers who provide
any contributions; the SCF estimates are inside the relevant ranges.  Overall, the two data
sources suggest a fairly high level of participation and contribution to tax-deferred savings
                                               
    
21 In order to compare the contribution rates with the CPS, we include all thrift plans in the table, whether or not
the worker also has another pension plan.  In our simulations, we sample only from the set of individuals for whom
the thrift plan is the only employer-sponsored retirement plan.
     22 The greater disparity in the totals than the average is presumably related to the over-sampling of high-income
workers in the SCFs.  Even with appropriate sample weights in each survey, the SCF is likely to do a better job of
characterizing values like pension contributions that increase with income.37
accounts over the last ten years.
23
Table A.1
Thrift Plans in SCF 1989, 1992, and 1995, With Comparisons to CPS 1988 and 1993




1995 1992 1989 1993 1988 Table
Workers (million) 103.2 96.1 93.6 105.8 101.7 21
Participants (million) 28.7 20.2 16.9 25.1 15.6 22
Coverage Rate (percent) 27.8 21.0 18.0 23.7 15.3 22
Employee Contributions
  Percent Contributing 78.8 71.1 81.4 69.7 77.4 24
  Avg. Percent of Earnings 5.3 5.1 5.8 4.9 5.0 23
  Average Dollar Amount 2502 2438 2635 1971 1994 25
  Aggregate Amount (bln) 71.8 49.2 44.5 49.6 38.0 24
Employer Contributions
  Percent Contributing (lo) 61.8 70.9 27
  Percent Contributing (hi)
72.3 64.8 79.7
80.0 75.9 27
  Avg. Percent of Earnings 5.0 3.9 4.6
  Average Dollar Amount 2160 1832 2030
  Aggregate Amount (bln) 62.0 36.9 34.3
Notes:
1) The SCF samples include all respondents and spouses that are currently employed.  The
sample in the CPS includes all civilian, nonagricultural workers over age 16.
2) The column marked “Table” refers to the table number in EBRI (1994) that is the basis for
the statistic in each row.
3) All monetary amounts are expressed in constant 1995 dollars.
4) Contribution rates in the SCF are prorated so that the total of employer and employee
contributions is no more than the minimum of $30,000 and 25 percent of earnings.
                                               
   
23 When necessary, we impose both dollar and percentage limits on the contributions to all DC plans and thrift
plans in all years (including 1983 in the simulations below) that are consistent with the current law for DC plans, as
documented in McGill et al (1997). Contribution rates are prorated so that the total of employer and employee
contributions is no more than the lesser of 25 percent of earnings and $30,000, with the dollar amount indexed to
inflation in future years.38
Appendix B: Imputations of Pension Plans Not Found in Pension Provider Survey
Only 73 percent of the respondents to the SCF 1983 who reported pension coverage
could be linked to a pension plan in the Pension Provider Survey.  This censoring is not
random—workers at smaller firms are less likely to have their plans in the PPS, while public
sector workers are more likely to have their plans in the PPS.  We used a hot decking procedure
to overcome the sample selection bias that results if the censoring probability is not uncorrelated
with the generosity of the pension plan.  For each person whose pension plan is not found, the
plan of a person with similar characteristics whose plan is found is substituted.  That plan is
chosen according to the following procedure.  If any step in the procedure would eliminate all
remaining plans, then that step is not taken, but the procedure continues.
1) Employer Type
The set of respondents with plans in the PPS is first sorted according the type of
employer: federal government, state/local government, public school/college, private school,
military, private employers with greater than 100 employees, and private employers with fewer
than 100 employees.  Military plans are imputed as their own group without further
disaggregation.
2) State of Residence
The set of respondents who work for state/local governments and public schools/colleges
are sorted according to state of residence.  For these purposes, the high-income sample is treated
as if it were its own state of residence.
3) Social Security Coverage
All categories (except for federal government employees) are sorted according to whether
the respondent reports being covered by Social Security in addition to the employer-provided39
pension.  As of 1983, some workers (generally public sector employees) were not covered by
Social Security.  The pension plans for these workers are designed to provide benefits
comparable to the pension and Social Security benefits of comparable private sector workers.
4) Union, Industry, Occupation
All categories are then further disaggregated first by union coverage, then by 1-digit
industry code, and lastly by 1-digit occupation code.
At the end of these four steps, each respondent whose plan is not found in the PPS has a
set of possible matches among the plans of those respondents with matching characteristics
whose plans are found in the PPS.  One of these plans is randomly allocated to the censored
respondent.  This procedure will remove any sample selection bias that is the result of the full
interaction of employer type (including state and Social Security coverage where applicable),
union coverage, industry, and occupation.  This procedure will not remove the bias that may
result from censoring within these categories.40
Appendix C: Modifications to Original Pension Provider Survey Code (Version 3)
The PPS 1983 documentation in Curtin (1987) also provides programs that calculate
pension entitlements based on the data in the SCF and the PPS.  They are sufficiently general so that
entitlements can be computed under a variety of economic assumptions for any individual in the
SCF or hypothetical worker.  Nearly identical programs for the PPS 1989 were obtained from the
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.  The modifications of these programs
discussed below are designed to enhance their technical and economic applications.  All changes
refer to both years of the surveys.
1) PC Compatibility
The first modification was purely technical; to change the syntax and file structure so that
the programs could be used on any PC.  The original programs are written in a version of PASCAL
tailored to the University of Michigan MTS mainframe computer.  This language also compiles on
an IBM RS/6000, which was used to generate the simulations in this paper.  In the interest of
making the pension software available to a wider community of users, the original versions have
been rewritten in Turbo Pascal, which can compile easily on a PC.
The original programs were designed in two stages.  The first set read the information on the
pension plans from the PPS dataset and created procedures for each plan.  The key step is to parse
the literal formula codes and generate programming statements from them.  The second set of
programs read in the information on the plan participants from the SCF and used the code generated
by the first set of programs to compute entitlements.  It was possible to adapt only this second set of
programs to the PC; the pension procedures were generated by the mainframe version and each of
the 1011 (1983) or 798 (1989) procedures must be edited individually (but systematically!) in order
to consider fundamental changes in the structure of pensions.  The modifications to Final Average41
Pay calculations and the indexing of nominal amounts to wage growth discussed below were made
this way.  PC-compatible versions of these original programs are available from the authors upon
request.  The remaining points refer to the programs as they have been modified for this paper.
2) More General Earnings Profiles
The original programs allow for an economy wide growth rate and an individual specific
growth rate.  The individual's growth rate must remain constant over his entire career, which is an
unrealistic assumption.  In particular, it does not simultaneously allow for high wage growth during
early years on the job and declining (and even negative) wage growth in later years.  In order to
incorporate variable wage growth over the life-cycle, the coefficients from cross-sectional wage
regressions are used.  In this paper, we use a quartic in age estimated on the 1983 Current
Population Survey for full-time workers between the ages of 16 and 64 to forecast real earnings.
3) Computation of Social Security Benefits
Many plans are integrated with Social Security either through the expected benefits (Offset
plans) or the maximum taxable earnings amount (Excess plans).  In the original versions, all
calculations were based on the average benefit, average covered wage (ACW), and Maximum
Taxable Earnings (MTE) as of 1983.  Individuals who had current wages above the ACW but below
the MTE were assigned the average benefit.  Those with less than the ACW received half the
average benefit, while those with more than the MTE received 150 percent of the average benefit.
In the new versions, the actual Social Security benefit formulas (and the more realistic wage growth
rates) are used so that true variation in the offset rates is revealed in the computed entitlements.
Additionally, all changes in the Social Security benefit formulas made in 1983 have been
incorporated, so that the effect of those changes on entitlements and retirement can be assessed.42
4) Calculation of Final Average Pay
Most DB pensions that are based on final average pay calculate FAP as the average of the
highest or highest consecutive years of earnings during some specified period.  For example, the
highest five years of earnings during the last ten is quite common.  When nominal earnings are
always increasing with age, which was the case when wage growth was uniform over the lifetime,
this formula reduced to the last five years of earnings.  The original programs calculated FAP in this
simplified way.  However, when a more general specification of the wage equation is used, it is
possible for nominal earnings at older ages to decline.  The simplified FAP calculation would
understate FAP (and therefore pension benefits) in such cases.  The modified programs compute
FAP in the precise way specified in the summary plan description so that this does not occur.
5) Indexation of Nominal Amounts
Since pension formulas are adjusted periodically in line with the firm's overall financial
position (and must be included in all collective bargaining arrangements), it is unreasonable to
believe that a formula that promises, say, $20 per month in benefits for every year worked will
remain at $20 in nominal terms into the indefinite future.  A more likely scenario is that the overall
generosity of the benefits will increase in line with price or wage growth.  In the current version of
the programs, every such nominal amount is augmented by a user-specified growth rate.
6) Incorporation of Pension Reforms
The direct effects of the various pension reforms during the 1980s are now phased in
conditional on the date as of which the benefits are being computed.  For example, TEFRA
(1982), DEFRA (1984), and TRA (1986) all set limits on the current or future maximum covered
wages, benefits payable, and contributions possible for qualified plans.